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  We assess the literature on public and private quality standards and their impact in 
food markets, international trade, and global supply chains. We focus on their effects on welfare, 
trade, industrial organization, and labor markets and with special attention to the North-South 
context. We also attempt to better characterize when these measures constitute protectionism, a 
complicate task. We look at studies investigating public and private standards and across various 
quantitative approaches and countries. These standards have complex effects. The evidence is 
mixed regarding standards as catalyst for or impediment against trade and development, 
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1. Introduction  
We assess the literature on standard-like nontariff measures (NTMs), their alleged protectionism 
and political economy, and their impact in international trade and on global supply chains. We 
focus on their effects on welfare, trade, industrial organization and labor markets.  
The motivations are several fold. There is the well-recognized emergence of public and 
private standards, which is concurrent to decreases in tariffs and other more conventional trade 
barriers. Simultaneously, there is increasing consumer perception of safety, quality, ethical and 
environmental attributes and concerns of due-diligence by global retailers in the wake of safety 
lapses with international ramifications (e.g., the recurrent melamine scandal).  
Figures 1 and 2 illustrate this emergence of public standard-like NTMs.1 Figure 1 shows 
the annual sanitary and phyto-sanitary (SPS) notifications to the WTO over time since 2000.2 As 
of September 2014, in excess of 17,000 notifications have been submitted to the WTO (WTO, 
2014a). The US, China and the EU are the largest generators of these notifications, but in recent 
years developing countries have caught up and now issue 60% of the SPS notifications. 
Similarly, there has been rapid growth of technical barrier to trade (TBT) measures as shown in 
Figure 2 (WTO, 2014b). From 1995 to end of 2013, in excess of 17,000 notifications took place, 
not counting 3,000 addenda and 500 corrigenda and that by 121 WTO members.3 
<Figures 1 and 2 about here> 
 Systematic data on private standards are hard to find because private standards are a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 The conceptual and methodological arguments in this paper are general, but many empirical cases are from the 
agricultural and food sectors where standards have grown rapidly, and on which much literature has focused. 	  
2 Policy notifications by governments are reporting requirements to the WTO to insure transparency and information 
dissemination to all trade partners and to give them an opportunity to ask for clarification or changes in policies not 
conforming to WTO rules.	  
3 SPS measures refer to health protection measures related to humans and plants. TBT measures are technical 
requirements, voluntary standards and conformity assessment procedures, except when these are SPS measures. 
Both are considered standard-like NTMs. Addenda and corrigenda are supplemental and corrective elements to 
further clarify or modify a notification. 
3 
	  
complex aggregate. They vary with respect to who initiates the standards (e.g., producer 
standards versus buyer standards); who sets the standards (e.g., collective industry standards 
versus chain or firm-specific standards); who adopts the standard (e.g., farm-gate standards 
versus manufacturing and distribution standards); the attributes they address (e.g., product versus 
process standards); the visibility of the standard in the supply chains (e.g., business-to-business 
standards versus business-to-consumer standards) ; and the motivation behind the standard (e.g., 
risk management versus product differentiation standards) (Henson and Humphrey, 2010; 
McCluskey, 2007). Yet, the few indicators that are available suggest a parallel explosion of 
private standards. Figure 3 shows that the number of GlobalGAP-certified producers increased 
from 18,000 in 2004 to 112,600 in 2011 (GlobalGAP, 2014).4  
Public and private standards not only differ in who introduces the standard (the 
government versus private or non-governmental organizations) but also in their nature – in 
particular related to trade. The WTO does not allow public non-product related process 
standards.5 However, private standards (over which the WTO has no authority) can cover a wide 
variety of aspects, such as labor standards, environmental standards that might not be product-
related. Even on similar criteria, private standards are often more stringent than public ones 
(Fulponi, 2007; McCluskey and Winfree, 2009; Vandemoortele and Deconinck, 2014). 
In sum, both public and private standards are ubiquitous; their numbers are growing and 
they are here to stay and have potential for various trade frictions as documented by Disdier and 
van Tongeren (2010). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 GlobalGAP is one of the most widespread private standards (GAP refers to “Good Agricultural Practice” and the 
standard applies to food quality and safety). The standard was initially introduced by a group of European retailers 
but was later adopted globally (see www.globalgap.org).  
5 Product-related process standards affect the final product characteristics like organic versus conventional fruits. 
Non-product related process standards do not alter the final product characteristics, e.g, like a newspaper print on 
paper with some recycled content. 
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<Figure 3 about here> 
Yet, despite these more stringent and more widespread standards, global agricultural 
trade has increased sharply during the past three decades. Moreover, the growth has been 
strongest where standards are most important, (i.e., in the higher value products) – which 
includes fruits, vegetables, seafood, fish, meat, and dairy products. In Asia and in Latin America, 
high-value products increased from around 20% of agricultural exports in the 1980s to around 
40%. The process is similar, albeit slower, in Africa (Maertens et al., 2012). 
The expansion of standards in trade has coincided with the growth of (foreign) 
investment and restructuring of the value chains. The best-documented effect is the so-called 
‘supermarket revolution’ as large retail chains increasingly invested in emerging and developing 
countries (Dries et al., 2004; Reardon et al., 2003). Value chains became more concentrated and 
increasingly organized through vertical coordination (McCullough et al., 2008, Swinnen and 
Maertens, 2007). These processes have important implications. Increasing standards are 
associated with higher-value products. High-value exports entail an important potential for 
raising rural incomes and reducing poverty because of the high intrinsic value and labor-
intensive production systems (Anderson and Martin, 2005; Jaud and Kukenova, 2011).  
These profound changes have triggered a substantive economic literature, much of it 
critical. There are two broad areas of critique. The first, which has attracted much attention of 
trade economists, is that standards are used for mercantilist reasons. They mainly focused on the 
potential or presumed protectionism of such standard-like NTMs, ignoring the potential 
consumer or societal benefits induced by standards. In sections 3 and 4, we review attempts to 
measure standard-like NTMs and their effects on welfare and trade.6 We provide a general 
taxonomy of approaches and discuss the key features of each. We first review the complexity 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 For a review of different theoretical specifications of standards in economic models, see Swinnen et al. (2015).  
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involved in determining the protectionism of these standard-like NTMs, in the presence of 
external effects and other market imperfections. Findings in the literature on the political 
economy of standard-like NTMs also yield ambiguous results: “over-standardization” or “under-
standardization” – similar to taxation or subsidization of agriculture – can occur depending on 
the political economy equilibria. Even though criteria can be conceived to determine whether 
NTMs are protectionist in this context, the empirical implementation of these criteria is daunting.  
Sections 3 and 4 (and the literature reviewed there) focuses mostly on public standards, 
which have been linked to protectionism. The critiques on private standards have concentrated 
more on their developmental implications, emphasizing that the poor in the world would be 
excluded from high standard trade and value chains. These critiques have induced a rapidly 
growing literature to assess these effects. In section 5, we review studies that focus on the impact 
of standards on the industrial organization and rent distribution of value chains and on 
smallholders, poverty and local labor markets.  
Finally in section 6, we distill pragmatic and relevant policy implications and 
recommendations for fruitful research directions to contribute to a better understanding of the 
impact of standards on allocative efficiency, welfare, and supply chains, in the North-South 
context. 
 
2. The Protectionism of NTMs: Conceptual Issues and Basic Indicators  
The near explosion of standard-like NTMs in recent years brings the questions whether NTMs 
are used for protectionist purposes, especially in the context of commitments to decrease or 
eliminate tariffs and expand imports under tariff-rate-quota schemes following multiple 
multilateral and preferential trade agreements (Bacchetta and Beverelli, 2012). How can one 
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determine if a standard-like NTM is protectionist?  
Conceptually, determining protectionism of standard-like NTMs is clear as defined by 
Baldwin (1970), or Fisher and Serra (2000), with some limitations highlighted in Marette (2014), 
and Marette and Beghin (2010). Consider a social planner addressing an externality in an open 
economy context with domestic and foreign firms competing for the domestic market. The 
optimum policy to address the external effect should maximize world/global welfare (Baldwin, 
1970). Deviation from the (feasible) optimum choice of policy instrument (Marette, 2014) or 
optimum level of a given instrument will be protectionist (Fisher and Serra, 2000). This includes 
policies that maximize domestic welfare because it excludes foreign firms’ profit (Fisher and 
Serra, 2000).  
However, the optimum policy to maximize domestic welfare (as opposed to global 
welfare) is not necessarily protectionist (Marette and Beghin, 2010). It depends on the relative 
ability of domestic and foreign industries to comply with the corrective policy. A similar result 
comes out of the political economy literature: lobbying of domestic firms and consumers may 
lead to standards being set “too low” or “too high” in the political equilibrium, depending, 
among other things, on relative costs of compliance (Swinnen and Vandemoortele, 2008, 2009, 
and 2011). Needless to say the complexity (or nuances) of these conceptual findings complicates 
the empirical measurement and its use for policy. 
 The empirical implementation of such protectionism concept is nearly insurmountable. 
First, one has to define the relevant “world” welfare, which countries, which industries, 
consumers in foreign countries etc. The optimum policy instrument and its level will be sensitive 
to the definition of global welfare and if it affects fixed costs or variable costs (Baldwin, 2000; 
and Marette, 2014). Second, the informational requirements to implement such concept are huge. 
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One would need reliable estimates of fixed and variable cost effects of standards on industries in 
many countries. Heterogeneity of firms makes this requirement daunting. External effects would 
have to be quantifiable as well as their valuation by consumers. 
In absence of a practical empirical implementation of these protectionism concepts, a few 
simpler tools have been used to try to gauge protectionism of standard-like NTMs.  
 A first approach – which one could think of “blatant” protectionism of standard-like 
NTMs, is using criteria set by the WTO. First, the science-based and risk assessment criteria set 
constitute the “science test” in Hooker and Caswell (1998). If a standard-like NTM is not 
addressing any market imperfection based on scientific evidence and a risk assessment (external 
effect, asymmetric information leading to health or environment hazard), then the policy is 
protectionist, except if it is set as precautionary in a legitimate way. The latter condition means 
that while science is being established, a restriction or policy impediment can be put in place 
temporarily. National treatment also provides useful guidance as differences in standard-like 
NTM imposed on like-products (domestic versus imported) would signal protectionism 
(Baldwin, 2000).7 Third, transparency has to prevail and trade partners have to be notified of and 
consulted about the policy in a predictable manner. The WTO also calls for least-trade restrictive 
policies.8  
This last criterion is more controversial because maximizing trade opportunities while 
addressing the external effect may not maximize welfare (Disdier and Marette, 2010; and 
Marette, 2014). For example, the WTO does not account explicitly for the impact of standards on 
consumer welfare through remaining market imperfections. Hence, economists should be queasy 
about this least-trade restrictive notion. One way to minimize the ambivalence is to think about 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 National treatment means that imported and domestic alike products should be treated similarly. 
8 Least-trade restrictive mains that among available measures used to address a market imperfection, a policymaker 
should choose the policy that restricts trade the least. 
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least-restrictive means (i.e., best in allocative efficiency for a given level of mitigation or 
internalization) as in Baldwin (2000). In addition, the WTO recommends – but does not require – 
reliance on international standards set by CODEX and other international bodies whenever 
feasible. Deviations from these have to be justifiable.9 This is an easy task given that the 
acceptable level of risk is left to countries to define. Deviations from international standards are 
the basis for the “policy test” in Hooker and Caswell (1999) to identify protectionism. This is 
also the basis for the stringency index of protectionism in Li and Beghin (2014).10 Setting a 
domestic standard more stringent than the international standard is, is not a violation of WTO 
rules per se –it is just a deviation from a recommended practice encouraged by the WTO.  
 However, once a standard-like NTM passes the test of the first three criteria (science-
based, national treatment, transparency), determining protectionism beyond this criterion 
becomes a “wicked” empirical problem for reasons explained above. Table 1 summarizes this 
section.  
<Table 1 about here.> 
 
3. Measurement of Standard-Like NTMs  
The literature measuring standard-like NTMs and their economic impact on trade and welfare 
has used various approaches to characterize them and aggregate them into some scalar indicator 
(Beghin, 2008).  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 CODEX stands for Codex Alimentarius Commission, jointly established by FAO and WHO develops international 
food standards and codes of practice to protect the health of food consumers, based on science.  
10	  Disdier and van Tongeren (2010) look at clusters of trade frictions expressed as trade concerns to the SPS and 
TBT Committees at the WTO to identify potential excessively stringent or costly NTMs in specific agricultural and 
food industries and by specific importers. They find that meat, dairy and fresh fruit and vegetables sectors tend to be 
highly regulated by NTMs and have high levels of trade concerns expressed by trade partners of OECD importers 
and therefore are prime candidates for further investigation for potential protectionism. They also find that processed 
product trade which is dominated by global supply chains is the least subject to concerns and NTM notifications 
which is consistent with limited demand for protection in these sectors. 
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For standard-like NTMs, it is convenient to think of a framework that includes the 
following economic effects: (i) the “protection effect” generating potential rents to the domestic 
sector; (ii) the "supply cost shift" effect, from the cost of compliance with the NTM for foreign 
and sometimes domestic firms; and (iii) the "demand-enhancement" effect, that captures the 
internalization of the external effect being addressed with new information or increased safety 
(Josling et al., 2005). In addition, some analyses looking at the removal of the incriminated 
NTMs incorporate the supply shift induced by potential pest invasion induced by increased trade 
(Peterson and Orden, 2008; Yue et al. 2006).  
Measuring standard-like NTMs is a challenge because the policy instruments involved 
are often dissimilar and difficult to aggregate; data are scarce for public policies and almost 
inexistent for private standards, except for collective standards like GlobalGAP. The 
measurement of a NTM is often tangled up with the quantification of its effects on market 
equilibrium, trade, and welfare. Many analyses use the price wedge created by the increase in the 
price/unit cost of imports induced by the NTM, the associated decrease in imports, the change in 
the own-price elasticity of import demand, the heterogeneous impacts of the NTM on trade and 
welfare (Deardorff and Stern, 1998; and Dee and Ferrantino, 2005).  
However, most of the time, standard-like NTMs come as a set of standards and 
regulations and cannot be characterized by simple tax schemes. Many NTMs are bundled and do 
not have a simple tax-equivalent instrument or require unavailable information to be aggregated 
into a meaningful change of unit cost. They require more ingenious and indirect approaches to 
quantify their effects on variables of interest (imported quantities, price, and welfare).  
Indirect and ingenious methods have been used because of scarce data, especially on 
consumer decisions (Beghin, 2008). Recent work in experimental economics has led to estimates 
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of willingness to pay for attributes corresponding to quality standards (Van Tongeren et al. 
2009). Below we review the main methods used in the literature to measure standard-like NTMS 
and then their impact. 
3.1. The price-wedge-ad valorem equivalent method  
This method measures the NTM regime by its impact on price. It is done by comparing the 
domestic price of a good relative to a reference border price of a comparable good. The tariff/tax 
equivalent of the regulatory regime is then used in further analysis to elucidate impacts of the 
NTM regime on resource allocation in the analyzed market or set of markets. Deardorff and 
Stern (1998) derive a large set of formulas of price-wedge equivalent for various NTM barriers. 
Careful applications of the price-wedge approach also account for border taxes, the cost of 
moving goods, and other trade costs to net them out and derive the residual effect of the NTM on 
the price difference. A synthetic undistorted price can be inferred using market equilibrium data 
and estimated price responses for supply, demand and import demand if goods are not perfect 
substitutes.  
This tax equivalent method has shortcomings. First, most regulatory regimes include 
several NTMs that are aggregated into a single price effect. It is difficult to infer the price effect 
or allocative effects of the individual policies. Second, quality differences are often ignored but 
should not be. Extensions of the method have been provided by Yue et al. (2006) for imperfect 
substitutes, and by Liu and Yue (2013) for time-varying quality and imperfect substitutes. In the 
latter, the quality differential between imported and domestic good converges over time. 
Assumptions made on the substitution between imported and domestic goods greatly influence 
the price wedge equivalent. Finally, omitted trade costs may be important and the price-wedge 
method may falsely be inflated. 
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3.2. Inventory-based frequency and count measures  
Another type of measure simply counts the number or frequency of NTMs affecting a given 
market. The count is a simplistic aggregator. Presumably, the higher the count, the higher is the 
potential “distortion.” The measures can be used in quantitative and qualitative assessments of 
the incidence of NTMs. Beyond counting the number of NTMs, some investigations use indirect 
indicators of complexity, such as frequency of trade detentions at borders, as well as frequency 
and counts of incidents or requirements derived from surveys of exporters to detect 
discriminatory practices in international trade.  
 The UNCTAD database (UNCTAD) has been used by many investigations either as 
count or frequency to derive coverage ratios (Kee et al., 2008, Beghin et al., forthcoming). These 
measures are not bilateral and often do not reflect NTM integration (Disdier et al., 2014). The 
various measures are simple frequency of NTMs by sector, frequency ratios for product sub-
categories subject to at least one NTM within a more aggregate category of goods; and coverage 
ratio computed using the value of imports of products (within a broader category) affected by a 
NTM, and defined as a share of the value of that category (Disdier and van Tongeren, 2010). The 
latter frequency measures can be used to develop relative measures in a given country in 
reference to accepted best practice or observed average, for example, for SPS or food safety 
regulations. One can also compare frequency measures across a set of commodities or countries 
(Disdier et al. 2008; Fontagné et al. 2005). Large deviations from the reference (best practice or 
average) can be identified and these deviations signal possible protectionist issues. 
 NTMs vary in importance across sectors and products. Frequency and count measures 
assume that numerous NTMs will lead to further distortionary or allocative effects, which may 
not be the case in sectors characterized by potential large hazard such as food safety. Survey-
12 
	  
based measures focus on perceived frictions rather than just a NTM count. They can also exhibit 
reporting and selection biases as not all firms answer and those who do may be inclined to report 
strategically to facilitate exports (see Michalek et al. 2005; Wilson and Otsuki 2004b). 
3.3. SPS stringency measures and heterogeneity index  
A stream of recent investigations have developed and used indices of stringency and 
heterogeneity across countries for SPS and standard-like NTMs regimes, using maximum residue 
limits and other policies that can be aggregated meaningfully. The latter approach goes beyond 
simple counts of NTMs and looks at stringency either in deviation from international standards 
(Li and Beghin, 2014), or from another reference value such as the highest value (Liu and Yue, 
2013) to gauge unusual  stringency if not protectionism. Bilateral heterogeneity of policies is 
also measured with the presumption that heterogeneity in regulation impedes trade (Liu and Yue, 
2013; Vigani et al., 2012), especially asymmetric heterogeneity when one country is more 
stringent than another (DeFaria and Wieck, 2014). Several “distance” measures are used. Drogué 
and DeMaria use a Pearson correlation coefficient of pesticide residue limits per product 
between any two countries trading the product; Winchester et al. (2012) use the Gower index, 
which takes the sum over policies of the absolute value of the difference of policy requirements 
between any pair of countries, normalized by the maximum difference in the data set between 
any two countries. Several heterogeneity indices can be developed for different types of 
regulations affecting sectors and their separate effects can be assessed econometrically. 
3.4. Transparency and harmonization measures 
A set of investigations argue that (some) standard-like NTMs are necessary to address market 
imperfections but can be improved by more transparency or reciprocity or harmonization (Henry 
de Frahan and Vancauteren, 2006). Defining transparency is complex, but revolves around 
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availability of information, and predictable procedures. Lejárraga et al. (2013) look at 
transparency provisions and their scope in an extensive series of trade agreements and develop 
several measures (count of transparency procedures in trade agreements, such as rules of origin 
or dispute settlements).  
Harmonization is captured by noting which products have been harmonized within a 
custom union (Vancauteren, 2013; Vancauteren and Henry de Frahan, 2011). Other analyses of 
harmonization use deviation from ISO standards as indicator or lack thereof, or they use 
adherence to ISO standards and mutual recognition of certification as a “harmonized” 
certification mechanism (Czubala et al., 2009; Blind et al., 2013). Disdier et al. (2014) capture 
harmonization of NTM regulation in economic integration agreements in the context of North-
South trade, when Southern countries harmonize “up” to their Northern partners’ standards. In 
the latter investigation, dichotomic variables account for one or both countries to be member of 
an integration agreement and then a cascading set of dichotomic variables for agreement-member 
countries to reflect the presence of TBT integration, and harmonization to regional or 
international standards. The (dis)similarity indices reviewed in the previous section represent 
alternative measures of harmonization or deviations from the adoption of international standards. 
 
4. Trade and Welfare Effects of Standard-Like NTMs  
The measurement of the NTMs is often entangled with its trade effect, especially when NTM 
regulatory regimes are characterized by dummy variables. Recent econometric analyses have 
tried to do better in estimating trade effects. For convenience, Table 1 summarizes key points of 
this section. 
4.1. Gravity-equation and related approaches 
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The gravity-equation approach has been used extensively and successfully to explain bilateral 
trade between two countries. Trade is assumed to be proportional to economic activity (GDPs, or 
output of exporting industry), and decreasing in trade costs between the two countries 
(transport/distance, linguistic and cultural, taxes, red tape, other). Trade costs are composed of 
distance, remoteness, barriers, and other transactions costs with varying degrees of sophistication 
(Feenstra 2004).  
However, the results of the gravity estimations should be interpreted with care. In 
general, the gravity literature on the impact of NTMs show mixed evidence depending on the 
direction of trade flows, the type of industries, the nature of standards and the methodology used 
in the analysis (Li and Beghin, 2012). Some authors find that standards are a significant source 
of trade restrictiveness for middle- and low-income countries (e.g., Anders and Caswell, 2009; 
Hoekman and Nicita, 2011; Tran et al., 2012; Wilson et al., 2003b), while others indicate that 
standards or their harmonization have no impact at all on developing country exports (Fontagné 
et al., 2005; Czubala et al., 2009; and Xiong and Beghin, 2012) or are trade expanding 
(Chevassus-Lozza et al., 2008; and Henry de Frahan and Vancauteren, 2006). Disdier et al. 
(2014) find that harmonizing to international standard is often benign or trade expanding for 
developing countries, whereas harmonization to regional standards is trade impeding for the 
same countries. The type of NTM policy instrument, which is, evaluated matters as well. 
Heterogeneity in GMO regulations seems to matter as well as in MRL regulations on pesticides 
(Vigani et al., 2012). Heterogeneity in other food-safety NTMs does not have an impact on trade 
in the analysis of Winchester et al. (2012). Consistently with these mixed findings, Melo et al., 
(2014); and Shepherd and Wilson, (2013) conclude that the direction and magnitude of effects on 
trade are sector specific and specific for different standards. 
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Gravity equations have obvious drawbacks. First, gravity-equation techniques estimate 
the trade effect of trade costs including NTMs, not their welfare impact. They ignore potential 
external effects or market imperfections, and thus potential welfare improvements brought by 
regulations that internalize negative externalities but restrict trade. Hence, the impact of NTMs 
on trade flows is not informative on their impact on domestic or international welfare in the 
presence of external effects (Baldwin, 2000; and Disdier and Marette, 2010). 
Second, the direction of the effect of the “NTM” variable on trade flows is constrained to 
be impeding in many gravity estimations. For example, Kee et al. (2009) econometrically 
estimate the trade impacts of various NTMs including TBTs for a large number of sectors and 
countries. Then they recover the ad valorem tax equivalent (AVE) of these NTMs using 
corresponding own-price elasticities of import demand estimated in Kee et al. (2008). However, 
despite this sophisticated approach, their econometric estimation constrains the NTMs to be trade 
reducing, and not a trade facilitation device that could enhance excess demand. Beghin et al. 
(forthcoming) use the same data set to estimate unconstrained AVEs of the technical barrier to 
trade component of the dataset. They find that 39% of the product lines affected by TBT-like 
NTMs exhibit negative AVEs, equivalent to a net-trade expansion induced by these measures.  
Third, the careful measurement of the effects of NTMs relies on decomposing trade cost 
(the price wedge between export source and import destination) into components of 
transportation cost, taxes, tariffs, NTMs and other transaction costs such as language barriers. 
Earlier investigations (e.g., Otsuki et al., 2001on aflatoxin MRLs) did not include tariffs but used 
fixed effects to account for them. As tariffs have been changing over time, this is not the best 
solution. This approach has prevailed in many gravity papers, unfortunately. Tariff data are now 
widely available. Improvements in measurement of distance and cost of transportation have 
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occurred recently in gravity equation estimation, and can better identify the NTM component of 
trade cost, relative to the impact of transportation cost or other trade costs in domestic markets 
(Hoekman and Nicita, 2011). Future research should decompose the export supply and import 
demand effect of the standards, rather than just focusing on net trade. The former is better suited 
for welfare analysis (Xiong and Beghin, 2014) 
Fourth, many gravity based analyses of NTMs cover multiple commodities/sectors, 
countries, and NTM regulations. Such approach provides a gross assessment and can address 
general hypotheses such as the effect of these NTMs or their harmonization on net bilateral trade. 
The number of observations required for econometric estimation often limits the ability to look at 
specific cases (a policy affecting a commodity). Pooling commodities, countries, and policies 
greatly facilitate the minimum data requirements for econometrics, but what is gained in 
generality and degree of freedom gets lost in the lack of relevant policy prescriptions. In a few 
cases, the gravity equation has been used to look at specific policy issues such as the EU 
aflatoxin, GMO policy, or antibiotic residues (Otsuki et al., 2001; Disdier and Marette, 2010; 
Xiong and Beghin, 2012; Vigani et al., 2012).  
Finally, the final-demand approach underlying most gravity specifications is questionable 
for intermediate demand, especially in agricultural markets. Agricultural goods are often the first 
input in a long value-added chain towards a final good. Some recent NTM investigations attempt 
to capture the intermediate nature of trade in agricultural goods like seeds or animal products 
(Jayasinghe et al., 2010; and Ghazalian et al., 2012). 
4.2. Partial equilibrium analysis 
This approach focuses on key components of welfare or cost/benefit analysis of a specific set of 
policies affecting a single or small set of related markets/commodities and the associated market 
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imperfections addressed by standard-like NTMs. These partial-equilibrium analyses rely on or 
extend upon other approaches to measure NTMs (tariff equivalent/price wedge, gravity/export 
demand estimation) to look at its impact on market allocation and potential externalities (Disdier 
and Marette, 2010; Peterson and Orden, 2008; Yue et al., 2006; and Yue and Beghin, 2009) and, 
in the context of global chains, on heterogeneous firms and labor market effects (Swinnen, 
2007). This approach can also be combined with an econometric estimation of key economic 
responses to the regulations to analyze which are then incorporated into the model. Most of these 
studies incorporate the possibility of external effects introduced by trade and derive welfare 
effects of the prohibitive policies.  
Yue et al. (2006) analyze the implications of removing SPS regulations in the Japanese 
apple market accounting for and estimating the imperfect substitution between local and 
imported apples as well as trade cost and the potential pest infestation linked to imports. The 
welfare gains from removing restrictive SPS policies are beneficial even when significant 
infestation occurs. Peterson and Orden (2008) incorporate seasonal effects, imperfect 
substitution, and risk levels in their analysis of the opening of the US avocado market to 
Mexican and Chilean products. They show that the opening induce net welfare gains to the US 
economy, even in presence of pest infestation.  
Several studies have analyzed prohibitive NTM policies such as phyto-sanitary bans or 
excessively stringent standards chocking trade. James and Anderson (1998) analyze the 
Australian banana case in which policies are shown to be welfare reducing even under 
implausibly large infestation levels. Yue and Beghin (2009) analyze prohibitive Australian 
policies faced by New-Zealand apples exporters and derive the forgone trade and associated 
welfare losses to Australian consumers. Orden and Romano (1996) analyze US-Mexico 
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avocadoes markets and show that the US ban at the time was motivated by capture of the policy 
process by US avocado interests. The risk of infestation was small and the ban increased the US 
price dramatically.  
4.3. Risk assessment and cost/benefit analysis  
Risk analysis and assessment, even qualitative ones, can be combined with the previous 
approaches and contribute to gauging a subset of barriers, especially safety and SPS standards. 
The SPS agreement tends to refer to economic losses to producers and externalities, but little to 
consumers welfare (Wilson and Anton, 2006). Nevertheless, risk analysis even in this spirit can 
assess the potential protectionism of technical barriers. A negligible risk is an indication of 
protectionism.  
However, risk is difficult to measure. Scientific knowledge or its absence is pivotal to 
decide if a standard-like NTM is science-based or not (the risk has been assessed or not), or if a 
risk is not present or is not insignificant (science could not establish a risk). The latter answer is 
often qualitative and is used by the WTO in its assessment of NTM and SPS regulations (Josling 
et al., 2005; Pauwelyn, 1999). The risk assessment combined with cost-benefit calculations 
provides expected net cost and benefits of the policies. Wilson and Anton (2006) conceptualize 
how risk assessment and production damages considerations can be extended to total welfare 
criteria to provide less restrictive policy menus to manage SPS risk linked to trade. These 
considerations had been laid down in Orden and Romano (1996). 
Incomplete knowledge on risk for health or the environment that can be linked to trade 
and their potential economic significance is often a caveat. This lack of information can be 
overcome to some extent by multi-disciplinary approaches and collaboration with non-
economists or by borrowing from other economic fields. Recent advances in consumer valuation 
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and willingness to pay for safer or better food have been used in international trade to analyze 
the effects of some NTM policies (van Tongeren et al., 2011; Disdier and Marette, 2012).  
4.4. CGE approaches 
Computable general equilibrium (CGE) models have also been used in the analysis of NTMs and 
SPS policies but often characterized by the shortcoming highlighted in the introduction. 
Economywide global analyses of the impact of the price-equivalent of NTMs are conducted by 
Andriamananjara et al. (2004), Fugazza and Maur (2008), and Winchester (2009). NTMs are 
treated as tax equivalents, but, as we explained earlier, it is not clear why the optimum NTM 
should be zero in the presence of market imperfections. Hence, beyond partial harmonization or 
elimination of protectionist NTMs, the objective of simulating wholesale removal of these NTMs 
is unclear. Even harmonization, although often shown to enhance trade flows, is questionable 
among dissimilar trading partners (Casella, 1996; Barrett and Yang, 2001).  
4.5. Approaches using micro-data  
Another approach is to use micro-economic insights and data. These studies use firm-level data. 
Econometric methods are used to analyze how an increase or adoption of standards influences 
the export performance and productivity of individual companies.  
The use of micro firm-level data to analyze the trade implications of standards is in line 
with the emphasis in the recent literature on firm heterogeneity in explaining international trade 
(Melitz, 2003; Helpman et al., 2008). For example, Chen et al. (2008) find, using the World 
Bank TBT survey database, that public quality standards in destination markets are positively 
correlated with the average export volume and with the export scope of firms in developing 
countries. Table 1 summarizes these different approaches to trade and welfare effects of NTMs. 
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5. Private Standards, Value Chains, and Trade and Welfare Implications 
The lack of representative data on private standards influences the nature of the studies. 
Most of the studies on the impact of private standards are case-studies focusing on specific 
sectors, often in low- and middle-income countries. Most studies look at one specific standard or 
in some cases comparing multiple standards. Data to measure the effects are often from surveys 
specifically designed for the studies, and mostly limited to cross-sections. Regression analyses 
are typically used to estimate the impacts.  
5.1 Private standards and trade 
Studies find positive trade effects of compliance with private standards for firms, although some 
recent research contradicts these findings. Henson et al. (2011) find that certification to 
GlobalGAP increases firms’ export revenues for a cross-sectional sample of fresh produce 
exporting firms from 10 African countries. Colen et al. (2012) indicate that certification to 
GlobalGAP increases the length of the export season for vegetable export companies in Senegal. 
Volpe-Martincus et al. (2010) and Otsuki (2011) find that ISO certification improves the export 
performance of firms in Argentina and in Central Asia.  
A major methodological problem is identifying causality. Studies based on cross-
sectional data are prone to overestimating the impact of standards because they fail to control for 
export persistence and unobserved firm characteristics. Schuster and Maertens (2013a, 2015) use 
18-year panel data on asparagus export companies in Peru and find that positive effects of 
private standards, including GlobalGAP, on exports disappear as soon as export persistence is 
controlled for. Because they are case studies, it is not clear whether these different findings are 
due to methodology or to differences in sectoral and country characteristics.  
5.2 Private standards, value chains and development 
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A large number of household-level studies analyze the impacts of tightening standards on poor 
households involved in global value chains, often as farmers or workers. Early studies warned 
about the dangers of marginalization of the poor with increasing standards (Reardon et al., 2001). 
Recent empirical studies document mixed effects of high-standards trade on exclusion of 
smallholders and mostly positive effects on household and farm income (Rao et al., 2012; Miyata 
et al., 2009); reduced risk and income variability (Ramaswami et al., 2009); farm productivity 
(Rao and Qaim, 2011); technology adoption and quality of produce (Dries and Swinnen, 2004); 
poverty alleviation (Maertens and Swinnen, 2009); and food security (Minten et al., 2009).  
To understand the mechanisms of how these welfare effects arise – and about the extent to 
which these effects can be attributed to standards – it is important to understand how standards 
affect the organization and structure of supply chains. Standards and NTMs can profoundly 
change the structure and organization of value chains. Standards reduce transaction costs in the 
chain because they reduce information asymmetries between buyers and suppliers about quality, 
safety and other product characteristics (Hudson and Johnson, 2003; Jaffee and Masakure, 2005). 
On the other hand, standards increase fixed production costs and transaction costs related to 
conformity assessment (or shift those costs from buyers to suppliers) and thereby create 
economies of scale and advantages for larger suppliers (Gibbon, 2003; Dolan and Humphrey, 
2000; Maskus et al., 2005). This is a concern for agri-food value chains in low- and middle-
income countries with a larger number of small and poor farms where implicit norms about food 
quality and safety in the local market differ substantially from the quality and safety standards 
that prevail in international markets (Henson and Jaffee, 2008; Henson and Humphrey, 2010; 
Reardon et al., 2009). 
Compliance with increasingly complex and stringent food standards and monitoring of this 
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compliance throughout the supply chain requires tighter vertical coordination. Also upstream in 
the supply chain, in the relations between producers and processing or exporting companies, 
there is a move towards vertical coordination and contract-farming, and towards complete 
ownership integration and large-scale estate farming. Tighter forms of coordination facilitate 
monitoring of compliance with standards and reduce transaction costs in high-standards trade. 
Especially in low and middle-income countries, where factor markets are highly imperfect, 
vertical coordination is imperative for adoption of high standards. As Swinnen and Vandeplas 
(2011) put it, vertical coordination is importantly driven by the combined effect of standards and 
local market imperfections, preventing local suppliers to invest in technology and quality 
production processes without support from their buyers in contract-farming schemes.   
In the rest of this section we assess the literature on standards and smallholder in/exclusion 
and on the welfare implications of standards for farmers and workers. A summary is in Table 2. 
<insert Table 2 about here> 
5.3. Standards and smallholder in/exclusion 
Numerous empirical studies analyze whether smallholders and family farms are increasingly 
excluded from value chains as a result of increasing standards in international markets and high-
income market segments. Most of these studies focus on a specific sector. Some studies look at 
one specific value chain; related to one company or supermarket; others use a sector-wide 
approach. Much-discussed cases are the fruit and vegetable export sectors in Kenya and Senegal 
where large shifts from smallholder to large-scale (vertically integrated) farming have been 
documented (Dolan and Humphrey, 2000; Gibbon, 2003; Jaffee and Masakure, 2005; Maertens 
and Swinnen, 2009; Ouma, 2010). The share of export produce from smallholders decreased 
from almost 100% to less than 50% with standards becoming more important. Similar changes 
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are observed in Latin-America (Reardon and Berdegué, 2002; Berdegué et al., 2005), other 
African countries (Gibbon, 2003; Weatherspoon and Reardon, 2003; Unnevehr, 2000; Supervie 
and Vagneron, 2013), Asia (Belton et al., 2011) and Russia (Dries et al., 2009). In most of these 
cases there is only a partial shift towards large suppliers and sourcing remains partially from 
smallholders. Henson et al. (2013) and World Bank (2005) point to a complementary rather than 
a competitive relationship between company own-farm production and sourcing from 
smallholder farmers. An exception is the tomato export sector in Senegal that is completely 
based on exporter-owned agro-industrial production (Maertens et al., 2012). 
Yet, there are also cases where specific contract-farming schemes for high-standard 
export or supermarket retail include a large number of smallholder farms. This is documented for 
example for the horticulture sector in Africa (Henson et al., 2005; Minten et al., 2009); for the 
horticulture sector and for animal production in Asia (Gulati et al., 2007; Roy and Thorat, 2008; 
Wang et al., 2009), and for the dairy sector in Eastern Europe (Dries et al., 2009; Noev et al., 
2011). Among smallholders, those supplying to high standard value chains are often those who 
are somewhat larger, more capitalized and more commercially oriented, as documented by 
Asfaw et al. (2010b), Handschuch et al. (2013), Hernandez et al. (2007), Kersting and Wollni 
(2012), Maertens and Swinnen (2009), and Neven et al. (2009). 
The studies have limitations and shortcomings. First, there are obvious causality issues 
deriving from the cross-section data sets that are often used, and questions whether other factors 
are sufficiently accounted for. Second, many studies either look at standards in general, pooling 
different types of standards without differentiating, or look at specific individual private 
standards and certification schemes. But standards are heterogeneous and the type of standard 
may matter (Henson and Humphrey, 2010). A few studies have used panel data methods and/or 
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have distinguished between standards. For example, Schuster and Maertens (2013b) use panel 
data methods to analyze the impact of different types of private standards on the sourcing 
behavior of asparagus export companies in Peru. They find that especially pre-farmgate or 
production standards, such as GlobalGAP, decrease the share of produce that export firms source 
from smallholders. Van Herck and Swinnen (2014) use panel data on dairy value chains in 
Bulgaria and find that the dramatic reduction in smallholder supplies is not due to standards but 
due to other economic factors.  
In summary, the evidence suggests that the effects of standards on the supplier base of the 
value chains are sector, country and standard specific. Despite the methodological shortcomings 
and difficulty of causal identification, evidence suggests that in several sectors and countries, 
standards induce the increased importance of large-scale and vertically-integrated production, 
but in other countries and sectors small farms remain dominant. To explain these different 
patterns of smallholder inclusion, Vandemoortele et al. (2012) develop a formal theoretical 
model of the emergence of the demand for high quality and safe food and analyze, which small 
producers are most likely to be included. They show that conditional on the initial production 
structure in the economy, the nature of transaction costs, and the possibility of contracting 
between producers and processors, certain producers are included in the high-quality economy, 
and others are not. Their model predicts that in a mixed production structure, with both 
smallholder farms and larger farm enterprises, smallholders are more likely to be excluded. 
When the farm sector is more homogeneous and dominated by small farms, it is likely that the 
emergence of high-standard production will be slower but more inclusive. These 
predictions/arguments correspond to the conclusions by Reardon et al. (2009) who, based on the 
existing empirical studies, find that smallholders are especially excluded if sourcing from large 
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farms is an option.  
The model also shows that reducing specific transaction costs (for example by 
investments in infrastructure, producer associations, third party quality control) can enhance the 
integration of small and less efficient producers in high-value value chains. However, this seems 
inconsistent with other sector studies that point at large small farmer inclusion in sectors without 
external support. A crucial component here is a private sector driven vertical coordination. Some 
empirical studies have pointed out that the inclusion of smallholder farms in high-standards trade 
and the adoption of private standards by smallholders is only possible with external support from 
development programs, public – private partnerships or collective action (e.g., Henson et al., 
2011; Boselie et al., 2003; Kersting and Wollni, 2012; Narrod et al., 2009; and Okello et al., 
2011). 
5.4. Standards and smallholder welfare  
The welfare of small producers who are included in high standard value chains typically 
improves. Some empirical studies find very large effects. Maertens and Swinnen (2009) find that 
farmers’ incomes double as a result of being included in the horticultural export chain in 
Senegal; and Dedehouanou et al. (2013) point out that this increases farmers’ subjective well-
being or happiness. Rao and Qaim (2011) and Rao et al. (2012) find that the participation of 
smallholder vegetable farmers in high-standard supermarket channels in Kenya increases farm 
productivity by 45% and farmers’ incomes by 48%, and this income gain results in poverty 
reduction. Minten et al. (2009) find that inclusion in a contract-farming scheme for high-standard 
vegetable export production in Madagascar increases farmer’s incomes and their income 
stability, improves farm technologies and reduces the number of hungry months. Dries and 
Swinnen (2004, 2010) find that participation of small-scale farmers in contract-farming schemes 
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in dairy value chains in Poland increases access to credit, technology and farm investment. 
Similar results have been documented by Gow et al. (2000), Noev et al. (2009), World Bank 
(2005), Negash and Swinnen (2013).  
Important channels of effects and reasons for (significant) increases in farmers’ incomes 
are technology transfers, and access to more and better inputs through vertical coordination in 
value chains. A second factor is that the enforcement of standard-induced vertical coordination 
schemes induces “efficiency premia” for farmers in the distribution of rents in the value chains, 
leading to income increase beyond suppliers’ reservation incomes (Swinnen and Vandeplas, 
2011). 
While these empirical studies provide important insights on the welfare effects of 
inclusion in high-standards values chains, they are less informative about the pure impact of 
specific standards on the welfare of farmers in developing countries. The empirical studies are 
based on samples including a mixture of farmers in high-standards value chains and farmers in 
low-standards local chains. The estimated effects are confounded effects assessing the joint 
impact of inclusion in export or supermarket chains, of inclusion in specific chains and contract-
farming schemes, and of the use of standards.  
Other studies have looked at the impact of specific standards adoption on the welfare of 
smallholders in a more direct and un-confounded way. These studies use various econometric 
methods to compare adopters and non-adopters of standards within a sample of smallholders that 
are included in contract-farming schemes and export chains. This allows disentangling the effect 
of standard adoption from other confounding effects. The results of these studies mainly point to 
positive (monetary as well non-monetary) welfare effects of the adoption of GlobalGAP and a 
few other private standards, albeit not for all farmers. Asfaw and co-authors (2009, 2010a & b) 
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find that Global GAP adoption among smallholder horticultural export farmers in Kenya 
increases farm revenue, raises farm income and improves farmers’ health (through better 
pesticide use). Handschuch et al. (2003) find that certification to GlobalGAP or US GAP 
standards among Chilean raspberry farmers doubles their incomes. Hansen and Trifkovic (2014) 
find that the adoption of private standards, including GlobalGAP, BAP and SQF1000, has 
significant positive effects on the income of medium-scale pangasius farmers in Vietnam, but no 
effect for small-scale farmers. Holzapfel and Wollni (2014) find that GlobalGAP certification in 
horticulture in Thailand has a significant positive income effect for farmers in producer-managed 
groups and for the largest farms but not for farmers in exporter-managed groups and for the 
smallest farms.  
All these studies focus on one single standard and use instrumental variable or propensity 
score matching methods with cross-sectional data. Only one study so far distinguished between 
private standards. Chiputwa, et al. (2015) compare the impact of Fairtrade, organic and Utz 
standards on the prevalence and the depth of poverty among smallholder coffee farmers in 
Uganda. Using cross-sectional data and methods, they conclude that Fairtrade reduces poverty 
but that the other two standards have no impact.  
5.5. Labor market effects and worker welfare 
The increased reliance of value chains on large-scale plantations and vertically integrated farms 
instead of smallholder farms implies that more of the gains from trade in agriculture emerge 
through labor market effects (hired labor on large scale farms) instead of through product market 
effects. In addition, standards increase the need for labor-intensive post-harvest handling (e.g., 
for washing, sorting, labeling), which further increases the importance of labor market effects.  
 Empirical studies of these labor market effects in high-standards trade, show significant 
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implications for rural households in developing countries. Maertens and Swinnen (2009) and 
Maertens et al. (2011) find that employment in large-scale horticultural export companies in 
Senegal (that emerged as a response to increasing standards) is well-accessible for poor and for 
rural women; and that this employment creates substantial income gains for rural households and 
results in substantial poverty reduction. Non-monetary welfare benefits of female employment 
include increased child schooling and reduced fertility rates (Maertens and Verhofstadt, 2014; 
and Van den Broeck and Maertens, 2014). Mano et al. (2011) show that employment in the cut-
flower export industry in Ethiopia significantly reduces poverty. Rao and Qaim (2013) point out 
that among smallholder vegetable farmers the demand for hired labor, especially for female 
labor, increases as a result of inclusion in high-standards supermarket chains in Kenya. Other 
recent papers are more doubtful. For example, Trivkovic (2014) finds no effect of employment in 
estate pangasius farms in Vietnam on the welfare of workers (using per capita consumption 
expenditures as measure of welfare).  
The increasing importance of labor market effects in high-standard value chains also 
implies a role for labor standards and on labor requirements incorporated in public and private 
food standards. Barrientos et al. (2003) find that the adoption of labor standards and codes-of-
conduct (including ethical and labor standards such as ETI and SA8000, as well as more general 
food standards such as GlobalGAP) among African food exporting companies improves the 
welfare of workings, although effects are less pronounced for temporary and female workers. 
Nelson et al. (2007) point to similar findings for the adoption of social codes of conducts in the 
South African wine and the Kenyan cut flower industry. Ehlert et al. (2014) find that workers in 
GlobalGAP certified vegetable export companies in Kenya are better trained.  
Other papers are less positive about the contribution that labor requirements in food 
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standards make in improving the welfare of workers in food export companies. Rijsgaard and 
Gibbon (2014) are skeptical about the contribution of labor standards (such as ETI, FLO and 
HEBI) in the East African cut flower sector to the empowerment of labor organizations and trade 
unions. Schuster and Maertens (2014) find that standards with a main focus on labor conditions 
(including SA8000, OHSAS18000, SEDEX, ETI and BSCI, among others) do improve the labor 
conditions of workers in the Peruvian horticultural export industry somewhat – for example 
lowering the probability of receiving a wage below the minimum wage – but not beyond national 
labor laws. They find that other food standards that include some requirements on labor and 
working conditions (including GlobalGAP and Tesco’s Nurture, among others) hardly have an 
impact on the conditions of workers.  
 
6. Policy and Research Implications and Conclusions 
The rapid growth of public and private standards has induced a large literature on their trade and 
development effects. Much of the international trade literature on standard-like NTMs has 
treated NTMs as pure trade barriers equivalent to ad valorem taxes and looking at their removal 
as being welfare enhancing, without considering market imperfections such as asymmetric 
information and externalities. Taking these market imperfections into account, NTMs have an 
ambiguous effect on welfare. Therefore standard-like NTMs are a challenge for the profession 
because there is no blanket policy recommendation paralleling those on tariffs or quotas. Sorting 
out the protectionism of standard-like NTMs is complex once one moves beyond the robust and 
simple detection strategy outlined in this paper. Policy prescriptions on standard-like NTMs 
depend on the particular context of the case analyzed. 
The relevant policy debate is about sorting the NTMs that are essential from those that 
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are inefficient and protectionist and on how to make NTMs more transparent. Further, policy 
making bodies should also focus on increasing compatibility of NTMs across trading nations via 
reciprocity, equivalence, or mutual recognition, and certifications of international standards. 
Redundancies among NTMs could be identified and eliminated along value chains using public-
private partnerships, such as “value/supply-chain councils” proposed by Hoekman (2013). 
Global value chains are important engines of wealth creation and policy making should 
recognize the interconnected nature of these chains and associated NTM policies and regulations 
(Hoekman, 2014). Finally, policy design should also focus on how to minimize opportunities for 
rent-seeking to manipulate these NTMs, especially in the North-South context. 
The latter point relates to the second major discussion about standards, which is their 
impacts on the poor. Early studies warned about the dangers of marginalization of the poor with 
increasing standards. Recent studies document mixed effects of high-standards trade on 
exclusion of smallholders and mostly positive effects on household and farm income, reduced 
risk and income variability, farm productivity, technology adoption and quality of produce, 
poverty alleviation and food security. To understand the mechanisms through which these 
welfare effects arise, it is important to understand how standards affect the organization and 
structure of value chains, and in particular the endogeneity of vertical coordination. 	  
There is much room for improvement of research in this field. We have identified a series 
of weaknesses of studies and methodologies that are currently used. Namely, they are the 
systematic consideration of potential market imperfections, better characterization of NTM 
regimes, their potential protectionism, and the interface between public and private standards, 
among others.  
Public and private NTMs are a full-fledged challenge to applied economists, from finding 
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data about them, to characterizing NTM regimes accurately along supply chains and consumers 
markets, to analyzing their various impacts. The promising route is the partial-equilibrium one 
capturing the potential market imperfections, the political economy and the various actors 
affected by the policy being analyzed. Large econometric investigations covering the full gamut 
of NTMs and CGE model characterizations using NTMs AVEs will remain gross if not 
misleading exercises. 
Further, there is evidence that other trade costs along supply chains matter greatly and 
might be more important than these NTM standards. Countries in the South with deficient 
infrastructure (from roads to ports to business climate) present a daunting barrier to exports, 
which deserves further “unpacking” into actionable policy recommendations.  
 The interface between private and public standards is another topic worthy of further 
investigation. Supply chains across continents have to meet private standards (in addition to 
collective private standards), of which we know little because they are often proprietary. Their 
function is to insure that stipulated quality is met and that expected health and sustainability risks 
have been minimized to preserve reputation and establish due diligence. 
 There is also a need to better integrate the NTM-type studies with micro-survey based 
studies to link the contributions from both and arrive at integrated conclusions. Micro studies are 
useful for identifying structural changes in value chains and their effects but it is difficult to draw 
general conclusions from the case study-type analyses.  
Most of the studies on the impact of private standards are case-studies using cross-section 
data and regression techniques. Obviously the use of panel data and possible experimental 
methodologies should improve on the identification and measurement of causal effects. Also, to 
derive more general conclusions about the welfare and poverty impacts of standards, more well-
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organized comparative studies on multiple standards or multiple sectors would be useful.  
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Figure 1. Annual new SPS notifications to the WTO since 2000 
 
 
Figure 2. Annual TBT notifications since 1995 to the WTO 
 
 
0 
2000 
4000 
6000 
8000 
10000 
12000 
14000 
2500 
2000 
1500 
1000 
501 
500 386 
0 I-
I Regular Notification ■ Addenda/Corrigenda I Emergency Notification 
845 897 
681 697 00 633 574 625 
,, 
' 
7 
( ) ( ,i ( :l I 7 ' 7 
■ Notifications 
21952135 
18891867 
1522 397 435 
1223 259 
1771 624 50:} 
541 
1031 188 
894 155 
724 130 1 
0 
6 
1, 1 
1 5 
~ E ) 
( D , 
Addenda/Corrigenda 
1 
3 
2 
1 
43 
	  
 
Figure 3.	  Number of GlobalGAP certified producers 
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Table 1: Summary of the literature on protectionism and trade and welfare effects of 
public standard-like NTMs  
Focus and approach Strengths / weaknesses Examples 
Protectionism and political economy of standards  
Conceptual and empirical 
papers on how to define 
protectionism  
• clear conceptual model but difficult to 
implement empirically 
• criteria using WTO principles 
• simple empirical measures using 
deviation from international or 
reference standards 
Conceptual: Baldwin (1970) and 
(2000); Fisher and Serra (2000); 
Hooker and Caswell  (1999); 
Marette (2014); Marette and Beghin 
(2011) 
Empirical:; Li and Beghin (2014); 
Liu and Yue (2013)  
The political economy of 
endogenous standards 
• look at the under/over provision 
relative to social planner 
Swinnen and Vandemoortele 
(2008) (2009) and (2011) ; Vigani 
et al. (2012) ;  
Estimates of NTM impact on bilateral trade across nations  
Large econometric studies 
using panel or cross sections 
of countries, many sectors, 
using simple proxies of total 
NTM regimes  in gravity-
type models 
Large CGE models relying 
on AVES of NTMs 
• typically abstracts from market 
imperfections  
• includes and  identifies several sources 
of trade costs 
• broad brush; Mixed evidence on NTM 
trade cost   
• cannot explain why estimated NTM 
could be trade-enhancing 
 
Econometric: Hoekman and Nicita 
(2011); Kee et al. 2009; Li and 
Beghin (2012); Beghin et al. 
(forthcoming); 
 
CGE models: Andriamananjara et 
al (2004); Fugazza and Maur 
(2008); Winchester (2009) 
 
Sector or policy specific 
econometric studies of 
standard-like NTMs with 
cross-section or panels of 
countries and subsectors  
• more detailed and focused on specific 
NTMs 
• cross-sectional and panel data based 
evidence  
• looks at heterogeneity, harmonization 
and transparency of specific policies 
across countries 
• studies single standard or set of related 
standards 
• can be combined with welfare analysis 
Anders and Caswell (2009); Blind 
et al. (2013); Czubala et al. (2009);  
Disdier et al. (2008); Drogué and 
DeMaria (2012) ; Fontagné et al. 
(2005) ; Ghazalian et al. (2012) ; 
Henry de Frahan (2006); 
Jayasinghe et al. (2010); Lejarraga 
et al. (2013); Tran et al. (2012); 
Vancauteren and Henry de Frahan 
(2011); Winchester et al. (2012); 
Xiong and Beghin (2012);  
Impact on societal welfare with partial equilibrium models  
Studies on the welfare 
impact of NTM regimes 
allowing for potential 
market imperfection  
 
Risk-analysis studies 
• can be combined with econometric 
estimates or calibrated 
• includes external effect or asymmetric 
information and risk of external effect 
• welfare includes suppliers, users, and 
external effects 
• NTMs can be trade enhancing or not 
and welfare enhancing or not 
Disdier and Marette (2010) , 
(2012); James and Anderson 
(1998); Orden and Romano (1996); 
Peterson and Oden (2008); Yue and 
Beghin (2009); Yue et al. (2006);  
Xiong and Beghin (2014); Van 
Tongeren et al. (2009); 
Risk analysis: Wilson and Anton 
(2006) 
Micro-level approaches  
Studies on the effect of 
public standards on firms’ 
export performance  
• difficult to identify causality 
• in line with recent focus on firm 
heterogeneity in trade literature 
Chen et al. (2008) 
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Table 2: Summary of the empirical literature on the trade, supply chain and welfare effects 
of private standards  
Focus and approach Strengths / weaknesses Examples 
Export performance of companies  
Studies on the impact of 
adoption of private 
standards on firms’ export 
performance 
• cross-sectional & panel data evidence 
• studies on individual standards and as 
well as studies comparing different 
private standards 
Colen et al. (2012); Henson et al. 
(2011); Otsuki (2011); Schuster and 
Maertens (2013a, 2015); Volpe-
Martincus et al. (2010)  
 
In/exclusion of smallholder farmers   
General studies documenting 
the in/exclusion of 
smallholders in high-
standards supply chains  
• no causal effect assessed 
• dynamics over longer periods assessed 
• evidence from a wide range of cases 
Dolan and Hunphrey (2000); Jaffee 
and Masakure (2005); Reardon and 
Berdegué (2002); Supervie and 
Vagneron (2013); and many others  
Specific studies analyzing 
the effect of standards on 
sourcing from smallholders  
• causal effects assessed 
• cross-sectional and panel data 
evidence  
• studies on single standards and 
comparative studies 
Schuster and Maertens (2013b); 
Van Herck and Swinnen (2014) 
Impact of standards on farmers’ welfare   
General studies on the 
impact of inclusion in high-
standards supply chains  
• effects confounded with other issues 
such as contract-farming and export 
market access 
• based on cross-sectional data  
• effects on various outcomes, including 
income, poverty, happiness, farm 
productivity, produce quality, 
technology 
Maertens & Swinnen (2009); 
Dedehouanou et al. (2013); Rao & 
Qaim (2011); Negash & Swinnen 
(2013); Rao et al. (2012); Minten et 
al. (2009); Dries & Swinnen (2004, 
2010); Gow et al. (2000); Noev et 
al. (2009);  
Specific studies on the 
impact of a single standard 
• effects singled out 
• based on cross-sectional data 
• income, poverty and health effects  
Asfaw et al (2009, 2010a&b); 
Handschuch et al. (2003); 
Holzapfel & Wollni (2014) 
Specific and comparative 
studies on the impact of 
multiple standards  
• effects singled out and compared 
across standards 
• based on cross-sectional data  
• income and poverty effects 
Chiputwa et al (2015); Hansen & 
Trifkovic (2014) 
Impact of standards on workers’ welfare  
General studies on the 
impact of employment in 
high-standard sectors  
• no direct effect of standards 
• based on cross-sectional data  
• effects on various outcomes, including 
income, poverty, female 
empowerment, child schooling, 
fertility  
Maertens & Swinnen (2009); 
Maertens et al (2011); Maertens & 
Verhofstadt (2014); Mano et al. 
(2011); Van den Broeck & 
Maertens (2014); Trivkovic (2014)  
Specific studies on the 
impact of standards on 
worker welfare 
• effects singled out 
• cross-sectional and panel data studies 
• studies on single standards and 
comparative studies 
Barrientos et al. (2003); Nelson et 
al. (2007); Ehlert et al. (2014); 
Rijsgaard & Gibbon (2014); 
Schuster & Maertens (2014) 
 
 
